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I. Introduction
Expenditures on housing represent the single largest item of
expenditures for most households in any economy. Expenditures on
housing purchases, in particular, amount to many years of income. Clearly,
the housing market and the macroeconomy must be closely related. The
purpose of this paper is to present a theory and some evidence for this
relationship.
The Hong Kong economy went into tailspin in 1998, declining by 5 per
cent. This was unprecedented: there was not a single year of negative
growth in all of Hong Kong’s history since 1962—the first year official GDP
growth data is available. The official explanation was the Asian Financial
Crisis, but this explanation is not convincing because it is not clear why and
how an attack on Asian currencies could lead to a crisis that is worse than the
Cultural Revolution of the sixties or the oil price shocks of the seventies or
the real banking crises that had actually caused multiple bank failures in the
sixties and in the eighties.
Hong Kong’s persistent economic growth prior to 1998 is nothing short
of a miracle. Hong Kong’s economy grew at a compound annual rate of
7.48 percent for four decades up till 1997,1 a record that is not surpassed by
any other economy. Even the Chinese Mainland, which boasts very high
growth and certainly presents another economic miracle, has a history of
credible economic growth that benefits the masses only since 1979. What is
the impetus behind this record growth in Hong Kong? Why did things
change so dramatically after 1997? Was it because Hong Kong’s “exclusive
franchise” as the linkage between the mainland and the world has eroded or
expired?2 Hong Kong’s doom, according to Richard Hornik, was because
China “has made huge strides toward opening itself to the global economy.”
But China’s opening up did not start from 1997, whereas the economic
downturn was immediate. Hong Kong before and after 1997 is like night
and day. The dramatic and immediate reversal throws Hornik’s hypothesis
into doubt. The inability of Hong Kong to revive notwithstanding strong
pickups in exports is puzzling.
We need to identify a number of relationships:
Was Hong Kong’s pre-1998 property market boom a result of underlying
1

Hong Kong started reporting official GDP statistics in 1961. It never reported a single year of
negative growth until 1998. The average compound growth rate over the 1961 to 1997 period
was 7.48%.
2
“Who Needs Hong Kong? Fortune, May 2,2002.
2

economic fundamentals? What explains the movement of the housing
market then, and what explains the major decline in the housing market after
1997?
Does housing market drive domestic demand (defined as domestic
consumption plus domestic investment)? Or does domestic demand drive
housing prices?
How does the movement of housing prices affect government revenues
and government expenditures? What are the causal directions?
It is said that because Hong Kong is now gripped in a serious deflation,
real interest rates are very high and that depresses housing prices. Without
downplaying the depressing effects of high real interest rates on housing
prices, we need to find out if it is high real interest rates that caused the
housing market weakness, or alternatively a decline in housing prices that
triggered the deflation and caused high real interest rates.
We found evidence for a property price bubble that began to emerge
around the second quarter of 1996 and peaked in the third quarter of 1997.
Roughly speaking, around 23 per cent of the peak price in 1997 could be due
to the bubble. Thus, most of the price increases that took place prior to
1998 was more a reflection of Hong Kong’s prosperity, low taxes, and wealth
than a speculative bubble. Given a regime of low tax rates, social and
political stability, free market institutions, the respect for the rule of law, and
benefiting from rapid growth on the mainland, housing prices had been
buoyed up by strong economic growth.
A statistical model shows that exports growth was really the driving
force behind housing prices. Alternative time series models, using the
autoregressive distributive lag (ARDL) framework as well as the
Granger-Johansen cointegration framework,3 show that a model with exports,
interest rates, and the inflation rate as key variables track housing prices
really well. It can be used to identify the bubble and predict much of the
signficant price decline after 1997. The model also predicts that housing
prices should have peaked in 1996 and should have picked up well before
2002.
The inability of the housing market to pick up from 2001 as predicted by
our model may be attributable to a policy to produce a major increase in the
supply of housing implemented after 1997, and may also be partly
attributable to a structural break reducing the “pull” effect of exports for
3

Results from the Johansen/Granger model are similar and not reported on space considerations.
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housing prices, which was found to have occurred from 1998Q1. We will
offer some discussion about the possible causes behind this structural break.
Because of space limitations, readers may refer to Ho, Haurin, and Wong
(2003) and Ho, Wong, and Tse (2003) for further evidence about possible
explanations for the structural break.
It is common for people to say that housing price bubble was partly due
to a provision in the Annex to the Sino-British Joint Declaration, which
restricted the annual land grant to no more than 50 hectares (excluding land
to be granted to the Hong Kong Housing Authority for public rental housing)
unless a relaxation to the limit is approved by the Land Commission
consisting of equal members from the British and Chinese sides.4 We will
present evidence that such a restriction notwithstanding, there is no apparent
shortage of housing prior to 1997. The housing market was essentially in
balance during the run-up to the handover. Housing prices can rise when the
housing market is in a moving equilibrium, much as wages and salaries can
rise when the labor market is in a moving equilibrium.
We do not dispute that housing prices in Hong Kong in 1997 were due
for a major correction. Indeed our model predicted the major correction.
But without the structural break and the policy-driven increase in housing
supply the housing market would have picked up long time ago. Further, it
is likely that government intervention to curb speculation in 1994 may well
have played a role in the formation of the bubble prior to 1997. Thus we
conclude that Hong Kong’s demise was home-made and indeed caused by a
miscarriage of housing policy, in particular inappropriate intervention in the
market to curb demand during the 1994-95 episode and then to boost supply
after 1998, and accentuated by the launch of the Tenants Purchase Scheme
(TPS) that offered even well-to-do sitting tenants the opportunity to buy their
subsidized rental flats at deeply discounted prices.
An important and extremely robust result is that domestic demand is
always driven by the housing price index. Causation does not run from
domestic demand to housing price. This explains why the domestic
economy fell so sharply after 1997, and why increases in unemployment was
concentrated in the domestic sector such as finance and real estate, retail sales,
and construction and decoration. However, there is a bi-direction effect
between employment weakness and housing market weakness.
We found that although Hong Kong’s exports growth declined after
1997, the degree of decline was in line with that for the world as a whole and
4

See http://www.hkbu.edu.hk/~pchksar/JD/jd-full1.htm
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actually smaller than that experienced by such economies as South Korea, the
United Kingdom, and the U.S. There was little evidence that the integration
with the Mainland played an important role in Hong Kong’s decline, and little
evidence that the opening up of China caused the Hong Kong economy to
shrink. The decline of the economy came just too suddenly for Hornick’s
hypothesis to hold, given that the opening up of China and the integration
with the Mainland had gone on for a long time and continuously.
We found the plunge in property prices the key to the huge budget
deficit that emerged after 1997. We present evidence that the Hong Kong
fiscal system was highly dependent on land-based revenues and indeed was
probably the closest model to the Henry George “single tax” ideal. Henry
George (1839-1897) was a social reformer who argued that the only tax
(hence “single tax”) that is required to finance the working of a government
is a tax on land rent. By eliminating taxes on incomes and all other taxes,
the incentive to invest and to work will be enhanced. The progress of
society will be reflected in higher land values, and the government can tax
land to fund all worthwhile government expenditures. It was no accident
that Hong Kong’s land cost was probably the world’s highest and Hong
Kong’s taxes were probably the lowest in the world prior to 1998.
Section II will provide some background to the Hong Kong housing
market, the policies in the 1994-95, and the policies under the Tung
Chee-hwa Administration. Section III will present the theory and evidence
about what drives Hong Kong’s housing prices and the relationship between
domestic demand and the housing market. Section IV will present the
evidence about fiscal policy and the housing market. Section V will
examine the relationship between real interest rates and the housing market.
Finally, Section VI will provide the conclusions.
II. Hong Kong’s Housing Market and Policies
Public housing has traditionally played a key role in Hong Kong’s
housing market. To deal with the rapidly expanding population, Governor
MacLehose announced in October 1972 an unprecedented public housing
programme. 72 public housing estates were to be constructed, to provide
decent housing to a total of 1.8 million people. These estates offer cheap
rents to qualified means-tested households. Then in 1978, the Home
Ownership Scheme (HOS) was launched, offering an opportunity for those
who were not qualified for low cost rental housing to buy their own flats at
prices lower than private flats. Most buyers of HOS housing were public
rental tenants, who were given a more favorable quota than others in periodic
5

lotteries set up to allocate the limited supply of new HOS flats among eligible
buyers.
Because of continuous economic growth and inflation, Hong Kong’s
housing prices had been climbing secularly for decades, though not smoothly.
Particularly after 1987, following the implementation of a policy to make the
richer public housing tenants pay higher rent, participation among public
housing tenants in the housing market rose. A priori, one could predict that
this inflow of cash into the housing market would drive housing prices as
well as housing transactions up. By 1992/93, it was found that 13 per cent
of public housing tenants owned a flat and as much as 24 per cent of housing
transactions were due to purchase by public housing tenants (Hong Kong
Housing Authority,1993). Subsequently, a Task Force on Land Supply and
Property Prices found 10% of sale and purchase agreements presented for
stamping in the two years between February 1992 and March 1994 involved
short-term resales. Deciding that there was prima facie evidence for
hoarding the Task Force recommended a series of anti-speculation measures
in June 1994. Among such measures, the initial deposit was to be fixed at
10% of the purchase price and 5% would be forfeited if the purchaser fails to
sign the formal sale and purchase agreement or enters into a Cancellation
Agreement with the developer. Stamp duties were also made payable at the
time a provisional sale and purchase agreement was signed and not at the
time the transaction was completed.
Apart from worrying about speculation, the government also had a long
history of worrying about the homeownership rate. In 1987, The Long Term
Housing Strategy: A Policy Statement, already made it clear that the
government wanted to encourage home ownership. Since then there had
been a number of attempts to sell public housing to tenants, but they had
failed because they were not attractive. Tenants’ tenure had been protected
and had been transferrable to future generations, while worn-down estates
were automatically replaced with modern ones. Tenants therefore needed
much more sweetener to find such schemes attractive. The Tenants
Purchase Scheme (TPS), announced in December 1997, finally made tenants
the irresistable offer of as much as 88 % off the estimated market value and
permission to resell after two years. TPS would play a strategic role in Mr.
Tung Chee-hwa’s vision of increasing homeownership from 50% to 70% in
ten years, as announced in his first policy address of October 1997.

6

The scheme immediately reduced the attractiveness of Home Ownership
Scheme flats, which looked ridiculously expensive in comparison.5 HOS
homeowners suddenly found a dearth of buyers.
Turnover in the
second-hand market dropped precipitously, and developers had to by-pass
existing homeowners in order to find buyers. After they have exhausted one
“crop” of buyers, in the following year they must further cut prices in order to
reach buyers with lower purchasing power. This was why home prices kept
falling even in 2000, when economic growth was actually quite high.
Interpreting the run-up in property prices prior to 1997 as resulting from
a shortage, Mr. Tung in 1997 announced a new policy of increasing the
supply of homes to 85000 unit a year (from an average of about 53,000 units
a year over the 1987-1997 period). From 1998 on through late 1999 the
government used every means within its control to boost housing supply.6
The surge in housing supply after 2000 reflected the result of this policy,
which was seen as the natural response to the surge in housing prices prior to
1997.
II. A Model of Housing Price Determination in a Small Open Economy
and the Exports Multiplier on Domestic Economy
A. Model
In principle, many factors determine housing prices, and they include
both demand side and supply side factors.
These factors include
demographic variables, incomes, interest rates, mortgage loan ratios, and
expectations about inflation, expectations about supply and income trends,
and the completion rate, etc. However, when the policy environment is
stable, and when the housing market is more or less in equilibrium, incomes
and interest rates should be the predominant factors. Since in an open
economy incomes are closely tied to exports, we hypothesize that exports and
interest rates were the fundamental variables driving housing prices.7 Table
5

For this hypothesis to carry weight, public housing tenants have to be active in the housing
market prior to the announcement of the TPS. This was vindicated as a survey by the Housing
Authority in 1992/93 found that public housing tenants were responsible for 24 per cent of housing
trasactions. Watanabe(1998) found public housing tenants had huge savings compared to private
housing tenants or owners.
6
Mr. Tung in an interview with reporters in June 2000 unexpectedly made the statement that the
85000 a year production target was no longer government policy. Earlier on, a story in Apple
Daily(July 6, 1999) reported that land lease conversions and land exchange in the first half of the
year would provide 16785 housing units, a new record in recent history. Plot ratios were also
increased over the years.
7
We exclude other sources of incomes on the ground that these are endogenously induced.
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1 presents a comparison between the housing stock and the number of
households in Hong Kong from 1987 to 2001. It provides some evidence
that the housing market prior to 1997 was more or less in equilibrium
notwithstanding the run-up in prices.
Table 1 : Number of Households and Housing Stock (1987-2001)
Thousands
Public Housing
Total Housing
No. of
Subsidized
Public
Increase Increase
Total
Households
Households
Sale Flats
Rental
in
in
stock
minus
Housing
public
Housing
Housing
housing
Stock
Stock
1987
1496.1
770
79
580
1429
67.1
1988
1532.6
804
34
84
596
21
55
1484
48.6
1989
1549.0
832
28
94
620
34
64
1548
1.0
1990
1559.0
864
32
114
651
51
82
1630
-71.0
1991
1603.1
884
20
131
667
33
52
1682
-78.9
1992
1640.0
919
35
147
680
29
62
1744
-104.0
1993
1677.7
946
27
162
673
8
37
1781
-103.3
1994
1729.1
962
16
182
679
26
41
1822
-92.9
1995
1783.0
1003
41
192
689
20
62
1884
-101.0
1996
1864.5
1030
27
210
693
22
48
1932
-67.5
1997
1922.8
1040
10
224
698
19
29
1961
-38.2
1998
1961.5
1056
16
242
706
26
42
2004
-42.5
1999
1998.9
1072
16
288
682
22
38
2040
-41.1
2000
2037.0
1099
27
327
688
45
72
2114
-77.0
2001
2078.4
1153
54
377
694
56
110
2224
-145.6
Sources: Data on the number of households are obtained from “Hong Kong Social and Economic Trends, Census
and Statistics Department, various years.
Data on the housing stock can be downloaded from
http://www.cityu.edu.hk/hkhousing/hs/figures/index.htm “Private housing” include privatized public housing/HOS
flats. Data on the number of households are the averages of the statistics for the four quarters of the years obtained
from the General Household Survey. Stock of permanent residential flats are as at end March.
Private Housing
Private
Increase
Housing in private
housing

If exports are the main driving force behind housing price, and if
housing price movements in turn drive domestic demand, we will have a
model about an “exports multiplier” linking exports to domestic demand. In
this picture the housing market provides a “transmission mechanism”
whereby the primary engine of exports gives rise to the secondary effects of
“non-basic” sector activities.
These basic relations can be summarized by the following equations:
LnPPI = α1 + β1LnEX + γPR + λ INFL + εt
(β1>0, γ<0 and λ > 0)

-------------------- (1)

LnD = α2 + β2 LnPPI +εt
(β2>0)

--------------------(2)

where PPI is the property (housing) price index, EX is total exports, PR is
prime rate and INFL is inflation rate.
8

To establish the long-run relations for these equations, we employ the
autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) approach to cointegration introduced
by Pesaran et. al. (1996). This approach, unlike the Johansen’s procedure
which requires all the series are integrated of the same order, provides an
alternative for examining the cointegrating relation of the underlying
variables regardless of whether the series are I (0) or I (1) and so we can
dispense with the need for pre-testing for unit roots. The error correction
version (EC) of the ARDL model for Equation (1) and (2) are given by:

∆ LnPPI

t

n

n

i =1

i =1

= α o + ∑ δi ∆ LnPPI t − i + ∑ β

i

i =1

+ θ1 LnPPI t −1 + θ2 LnEX t −1 + θ3 PR t −1 + θ4 INFL t − i + ε t

∆ LnD

t

=

n

α + ∑ δ ∆ LnD
o

i =1

i

n

t −i

+ ∑β
i =1

i

n

n

∆ LnEX t −i + ∑ γ

∆ LnPPI

t −i

i

∆ PR t −i + ∑ λ i ∆ INFL t −i
i =1

--------------------(3)

+ θ 5 LnD t −1 + θ 6 LnPPI

t −1

+ εt

--------------------(4)

Another advantage of the ARDL framework over the Johansen approach
is that there is no need to impose a uniform lag structure in the error
correction model.
The ARDL approach consists of several steps. To begin with, we carried
out a stability tests for investigating the existence of a long run relationship.
The null hypotheses for the statistical tests, namely that no cointegrating
relationship exists between the variables, can be stated as follows:
Ho1: θ1=θ2=θ3=θ4= 0
Ho2: θ5=θ6= 0
The null hypotheses can be tested by the F-statistic. Note that this
statistic has a non-standard distribution irrespective of whether the series are I
(0) or I (1). Two sets of asymptotic critical values (CV) - the lower bound CV
(assuming all the variables are I (0) and the upper bound CV (assuming all
the variables are I (1) ), have been computed by Pesaran et. al. (1996). If the
computed F-statistic for the test lies above the upper bound, then the null of
no cointegration can be rejected and we can conclude that a long-run
relationship between the variables does exist. If the test statistic falls below
the lower bound, then the null cannot be rejected. If the test statistic falls in
between the bounds, then the result is inconclusive. Once the existence of
long-run relationship is confirmed, the ARDL model is then applied to
estimate the coefficients of this long-run relation and we can derive the
associated ARDL error correction model based on different lag selection
criterion.
9

B. Estimation Results:
1. Relationship between Property Price (LnPPI), Export Performance
(LnEX), Prime Rate (PR), and Inflation (INFL), 1984Q1 – 1994Q2
In the first instance, we estimate the parameters in the basic housing
price model for the interval 1984 to 1994:Q2. This is a period with stable
monetary regime, a period of relative political stability after the signing of the
Sino-British Joint Declaration removing much of the uncertainty about
Hong Kong’s future, one with relative balance in supply and demand, and
relative stability in housing policy.8
As the estimation results may be sensitive to different lag orders in VAR,
to avoid this, we try different lags (2, 4 ,6 and 8 lags on the first difference of
each variable) and see whether or not these could yield consistent results. As
can be seen in the Table 2.1, the computed F-statistic F (LnPPI | LnEX, PR,
INFL) = 5.00 when lags = 8 when the PPI is taken as the dependent variable.
Since the value exceeds the upper bound of the critical value bound, we can
reject the null of no long-run relationship between LnPPI, LnEX, PR and
INFL.
In the next stage, we have to determine the lag order of ARDL model.
The maximum lag orders set at 6 and the optimal lag structure is determined
by the AIC information criteria. The selected ARDL model is (6, 0, 6, 0). The
analysis then moves to estimate the coefficients of the long-run relationship
and also the associated ARDL error correction model. The estimated
coefficients are reported in the Table 2.2. All the explanatory variables carry a
significant expected sign. The estimate of the error correction model is
reported in the Table 2.3. The error term is negative and highly significant
which also confirms our earlier findings that cointegration exists between the
variables.
Using the parameters estimated for this period, and inserting the realized
values for total exports, inflation rates, and interest rates, both the fitted and
the forecast housing price indices from mid 1984 through 2002 are presented
in Figure 1. Amazingly, we found that the model forecasts housing prices
quite well. We also found that there was apparently a bubble from 1996 to
1997, which appears to have emerged precisely because housing prices were
suppressed prior to 1996. We discover that housing prices should have
peaked in 1996 at a much lower level. Some 23 per cent of the peak price in
1997 may represent the bubble. Moreover, housing prices should have
8

Throughout this period, an annual 50 hectare land sale limit applies, unless special approval to
relax the limit was given by the Land Commission.
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bottomed out in 2001 and rebounded strongly with the recovery of exports.
Housing prices in mid 2003 should have been some 40 per cent above
realized values.
Figure 1. Fitted Values and Dynamic Forecasts for the Level of PPI
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250
200
150
100
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Table 2.1 : F-Statistics for Testing the Existence of a Long-Run Relationship Between
Property Price, Total Export and Prime Interest Rate, 1984Q1 to 1994Q2
Dependent Variables:
Lag=2
Lag=4
Lag=6
Lag=8
ΔLnPPI
1.5841
1.3143
2.6849
4.9991**
Note:
1. The critical value bounds for the test are 3.79-4.35 at the 95% significance level, which are given in
Table C1.iii (with an unrestricted intercept and no trend; number of regressors=3), Shin and Smith
(1999).
2. ** denotes 95% significance level and Δ denotes first difference.

Table 2.2 : Estimated Long-Run Coefficients (Dependent variable: LnPPI)
Regressors
Coefficient (t-ratio)
Intercept
-8.1132 (-8.2318)***
LnEX
1.0720 (13.0848)***
PR
-0.4547 (-2.3117)**
INFL
0.0429 (2.6215)**
Note:
1.
Optimal Lag: ARDL (6,0,6,0) selected based on AIC Information criteria
2.
*** denotes 1% significance level
11

Table 2.3 : Error Correction Representation of ARDL Model
(Dependent variable:ΔLnPPIt)
Regressors
Coefficient (t-ratio)
Intercept
-2.8177 (-4.0731)***
ΔLnPPIt-1
0.5014 (2.9518)***
-0.1792 (-0.9082)
ΔLnPPIt-2
0.3968 (1.8762)*
ΔLnPPIt-3
-0.2535 (-1.2435)
ΔLnPPIt-4
-0.3209 (-1.7659)*
ΔLnPPIt-5
-0.0158 (-2.0824)
ΔPR
ΔINFL
-0.0089 (-0.4357)
0.0047 (0.1922)
ΔINFLt-1
-0.0456 (-2.1219)**
ΔINFLt-2
0.0083 (0.3920)
ΔINFLt-3
0.1470 (0.6966)
ΔINFLt-4
-0.0397 (-2.2290)**
ΔINFLt-5
0.3723 (4.2933)***
ΔlnEX
-0.3473 (-4.1336)***
ECMt-1
Note:
1. Optimal Lag: ARDL (6,0,6,0) selected based on AIC Information criteria
2. *, ** and *** denotes 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively

2. Estimation Results with Policy Variables Built In: 1984Q1 – 2001Q1
In this section, we will try to identify if there was a structural change in
the statistical relationship between housing prices and exports that occurred
some time between the Asian Financial Crisis and the end of 1998 to the
underlying relationship determining housing prices. To do this we avoid
making any prior assumptions about whether a structural change had
occurred and when it had occurred. We just let the data tell the story.
Since we know that considerable over-supply emerged after the first quarter
of 2001 we end the estimation period to avoid invalidating the model, since
as we have explained, the analysis presumes that demand and supply are
roughly in balance.
To test if there was a structural change in the statistical relationships that
occurred during or after transition to Chinese sovereignty we introduce an
intercept dummy variable “D” (all values being equal to zero prior to the
structural change and equal to zero after the structural change) and an
interactive dummy variables (a binary 0,1 dummy multiplied to key
explanatory variables) in the ARDL model.. The coefficient on the intercept
dummy would capture any shift in the relationship. The coefficients on the
12

interactive variables would capture any change in the slopes of the key
explanatory variables.
Table 2.4 : F-Statistics for Testing the Existence of a Long-Run Relationship Between
Property Price on the one hand, and Total Export and Prime Interest Rate (with interactive
dummy), on the other hand, 1984Q1 to 2001Q1
Dependent
Lag=2
Lag=4
Lag=6
Lag=8
Variable:
ΔLnPPI
3.9049
2.9570
9.2365**
8.5862**
Note:
1. The critical value bounds for the test are 4.04 – 4.78 at the 90% significance level, 6.84 – 7.84 at the 99%
significance level which are given in Table C1.iii (with an unrestricted intercept and no trend; number
of regressors=1), Shin and Smith (1999).
2. * and *** denote 90 and 99% significance level respectively and Δ denotes first difference.
3. D98Q1 (prior 98 Q1=0, =1 onwards), LnEX * D98Q1 are included in the model.

As can be seen in the Table 2.4, the null hypothesis of no cointegration
can be rejected for the lag = 6 and 8 when LnPPI is the dependent variable.
Since the value exceeds the upper bound of the critical value bound
(particularly when a higher order of lag is included in the model), it indicates
that the inclusion of the interactive variables retain the long run relation
between the LnPPI, LnEX, PR and INFL.
Without prejudging the timing of a structural change that may occur, and
mainly for illustration purposes, Table 2.5 and Table 2.6 present the estimates
for the long run coefficients and the error correction model when the dummy
variables are switched from 0 to unity in the first quarter of 1998. The
estimated long-run coefficients and the error correction representation have
been selected by the AIC information criteria (the maximum lag orders set at
6). Coefficients on LnEX and PR carry the significant expected sign, and
the error term in the EC-ARDL model is negative and highly significant
which also confirms our earlier findings that cointegration exists between the
variables. As Table 2.5 shows, the estimated coefficients for the export
interactive dummies is significant indicating that some structural change has
reduced the positive effects of exports growth on housing prices. We must
now conduct a timing test to reveal whether 1998 Quarter One was indeed the
time a structural change occurred and explore the reasons causing the
structural change.
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Table 2.5 : Estimated Long-Run Coefficients (Dependent variable: LnPPI)
Regressors
Coefficient (t-ratio)
Intercept
-8.2364 (-17.6958)***
PR
-0.0527 (-3.7096)***
INFL
0.0105 (1.2329)
LnEX
1.1168 (31.6069)***
D98Q1
13.4904 (1.6832)*
LnEX * D98Q1
-1.0546 (-1.7029)*
Note:
1. Optimal Lag: ARDL (4, 0, 4, 6) selected based on AIC Information criteria
2. * and *** denotes 10& and 5% significance level respectively

Table 2.6 : Error Correction Representation of ARDL Model
(Dependent variable:ΔLnPPIt)
Regressors
Coefficient (t-ratio)
Intercept

-3.2554 (-4.8622)***

0.5376 (4.3806)
0.2391 (1.54131)
0.1766 (1.3336)
-0.0208 (-2.8030)***
-0.0587 (-2.7256)***
0.0588 (2.4474)**
0.0042 (0.1587)
-0.0260 (-1.3848)
-1.1149(-0.5510)
-0.6283 (-2.5454)**
0.2453 (1.0486)
-0.0492 (-0.2162)
-0.7518 (-3.2528)***
-0.3476 (-1.4823)

ΔLnPPIt-1
ΔLnPPIt-2
ΔLnPPIt-3
ΔPR
ΔINFL
ΔINFLt-1
ΔINFLt-2
ΔINFLt-3
ΔlnEX
ΔlnEXt-1
ΔlnEXt-2
ΔlnEXt-3
ΔlnEXt-4
ΔlnEXt-5
ΔD98Q1
ΔLnEX * D98Q1
ECMt-1

5.3320 (1.5479)
-0.4168 (-1.5658)
-0.3953 (-5.0971)***

Note:
1. Optimal Lag: ARDL (4, 0, 4, 6) selected based on AIC Information criteria
2. ** and *** denotes 5% and 1% significance level respectively

Under this timing test, we switch the dummy variables from zero to
unity in different quarters, and observe the changes in the coefficients
estimates and the test statistics. Table 2.7 shows an obvious jump in the t
statistic between 97Q4 and 98Q1 and a discrete sizeable increase in the key
coefficients, suggesting that something rather sudden occurred shortly before
1998 Quarter One. The sudden nature of the change suggests some kind of
policy-triggered “regime shift.”
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As it happens, a major housing policy change, in the form of the Tenants
Purchase Scheme, was announced on December 8. Given that public
housing tenants had been active in the home purchase market, the
attractiveness of the TPS can indeed be very disruptive of the housing market,
as private homeowners who had been dependent on them to buy their
properties so they could trade up could no longer do so after they disappeared.
Table 2.7 shows the results of this timing test. It shows that the best
goodness of fit and the best test statistics occur when the dummies switch to
unity in 1998Q1.
Table 2.7 : Timing Test With Dummies Switching to Unity in Different Quarters
Quarter with Value of
Intercept
LnEX * D
Adjusted R2 in ECM
Dummy Switching to
Dummy, D
model
Unity
1997Q1
-9.9555
0.7909
0.6425
(-0.6221)
(0.6367)
1997 Q2
0.9158
-0.0758
0.5990
(0.0726)
(-0.0778)
1997 Q3
6.6088
-0.5204
0.6143
(0.6014)
(-0.6128)
1997 Q4
13.7312
-1.0762
0.6300
(1.3308)
(-1.3500)
1998 Q1
13.4904
-1.0546
0.6604
(1.6832)*
(-1.7029)*
1998 Q2
12.8367
-0.9982
0.6139
(1.3410)
(-1.3486)
1998 Q3
12.7548
-0.9998
0.6325
(1.4839)
(-1.5053)
Note: Figures are estimated coefficients and the adjusted R2 for the error correction models. T statistics
are in brackets. D is a dummy variable that switches to unity in the quarter on the left column.

In addition, using the parameters estimated, and setting the time-based
dummy variable to zero, we can project what the housing prices would have
been, had policies triggering the structural break not been implemented. The
results of this exercise is presented in Figure 2. Just as before we predict a
major decline in housing prices early 1998 but housing prices should have
picked up, especially after 2001. The failure of housing prices to pick up
notwithstanding a rebound in exports may be partly due to over supply after
2001 and partly due to the diminution of the “exports multiplier” after 1998.
For the first quarter of 2001, forecast prices without the structural change
were 17.3 per cent higher than actual prices. After 2001, the excess supply
would further weigh down upon actual prices, while the strong exports would
lift up housing prices, but this is not shown in the diagram.
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Figure 2. Actual and Forecase Value of PPI
(Using Dummy Variable), 1984-2001
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Note: Housing prices are in their natural scale.

Anti-logarithms have been taken.

3. Relationship between Domestic Demand (LnD) and Property Price
(LnPPI), 1984Q1 – 2002Q3
It is important to identify the direction of causality between domestic
demand and property price. As can be seen in Table 3.1, the null hypothesis
of no long run relationship can be rejected, under the ARDL approach, for the
lags=2 when LnD is the dependent variable. Since the value exceeds the
upper bound of the critical value bound, we can reject the null of no long-run
relationship between the LnD and LnPPI. On the other hand, when we turn
the LnPPI around to serve as the dependent variable all the corresponding
F-statistics fall below the lower bound critical value (4.94 and 4.04 at 5% and
10% significance level respectively). Therefore the null hypothesis of
non-existence of cointegration cannot be rejected. The above results indicate
that only F (LnD | LnPPI) is significant. A long-run-relationship exists with
the LnD as the dependent variable and housing price index (in logarthims)
LnPPI as the driving variables for the explanation of LnD.
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Table 3.1 : F-Statistics for Testing the Existence of a Long-Run Relationship Between
Private Domestic Demand and Property Price, 1984Q1 to 2002Q3
Dependent
Lag=2
Lag=4
Lag=6
Lag=8
Variables:
ΔLnD
4.83*
3.46
3.17
3.33
ΔLnPPI
1.70
0.65
0.32
0.75
Note:
1. The critical value bounds for the test are 4.94 – 5.73 at the 95% significance level and 4.04 - 4.78 at the
90% significance level, which are given in Table C1.iii (with an unrestricted intercept and no trend;
number of regressor=1), Shin and Smith (1999).
2. * and ** denotes 10% and 95% significance level respectively.

Table 3.2 : Estimated Long-Run Coefficients (Dependent variable: LnD)
Regressors
Coefficient (t-ratio)
Intercept
8.6597 (22.1448)***
LnPPI
0.6878 (9.9381)***
Note:
1. Optimal Lag: ARDL (2, 0) selected based on AIC Information criteria
2. *** denotes 1% significance level

Table 3.3 Error Correction Representation of ARDL Model (Dependent variable:ΔLnDt)
Regressors
Coefficient (t-ratio)
Intercept
0.7668 (3.7053)***
ΔLnDt-1
-0.3619 (-3.6092)***
ΔLnPPI
0.2430 (3.6875)***
ECMt-1
-0.0886 (-3.4313)***
Note:
1. Optimal Lag: ARDL (2, 0) selected based on AIC Information criteria
2. *** denotes 1% significance level respectively

The estimated long-run coefficients and the error correction
representation selected by the AIC information criteria are reported in the
Table 3.2 and 3.3 respectively (the maximum lag orders set at 3). The LnPPI
carries the significant expected sign (Table 2.2), and the error term in the
EC-ARDL model is negative and highly significant (Table 2.3) which also
confirms our earlier findings that cointegration exists between the variables.
The size of the error term is 0.09 which indicates that once the domestic
demand has experienced an external shock, it takes around 2.5 to 3 years for
the domestic demand to return its equilibrium.
A related result is the relationship between employment changes and
housing price movements. A bi-directional relationship was found using the
Johansen-Granger technique and was reported in Ho, Tse, and Wong (2003).

17

III. Relationship between Fiscal Variables and Housing Price
Two simple hypotheses to be tested is whether housing prices drive
government expenditures, and whether housing prices drive government
revenues.
Mathematically, that housing prices drive government
expenditures and government revenues can be represented by the following
equations:
LnG = α3 + β3 LnPPI +εt
(β3>0)

--------------------(5)

LnGR =α4 + β4 LnPPI +εt
(β4>0)

--------------------(6)

These relationships are estimated under the ARDL framework. The
above long run relationship is estimated by the ARDL model. For the
government revenue relation, we need to add two dummies variables (1999=1,
other=0 and 2000=1, other=0) to capture the effect of one-time increase of
government revenue resulting from sale of stocks in 1999 and 2000.9 The
data are annual from 1984 to 2001.
Table 4.1 : F-Statistics for Testing the Existence of a Long-Run Relationship Between
Government Expenditures and Property Price, 1984Q1 to 2002Q3
Dependent
Lag=2
Lag=4
Lag=6
Lag=8
Variables:
ΔLnG
5.21*
1.37
0.85
0.56
ΔLnPPI
1.99
2.10
2.77
2.46
Note:
1. The critical value bounds for the test are 4.94 – 5.73 at the 95% significance level and 4.04 - 4.78 at the 90%
significance level, which are given in Table C1.iii (with an unrestricted intercept and no trend; number of
regressor=1), Shin and Smith (1999).
2. * denotes 10% significance level respectively.

Table 4.2 : Estimated Long-Run Coefficients (Dependent Variable: LnG)
Regressors
Coefficient (t-ratio)
Intercept
5.7429 (14.590)***
LnPPI
0.9108 (12.1273)***
Note:
1. *** denotes 1% significance level
2. Optimal Lag: ARDL (2, 0) selected based on AIC Information criteria
9

The HKSAR government spent some 120 billion dollars in the summer of 1998 buying stocks to
counteract what was described as the “double play” of some hedge funds: making money from
index futures by depressing stock prices. This yielded a huge profit as the government sold them
in stages to Hong Kong people in the form of a “tracker fund.”
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Table 4.3 : Error Correction Representation of ARDL Model (Dependent variable:ΔLnGt)
Regressors
Coefficient (t-ratio)
Intercept
0.4803 (4.7506)***
ΔLnGt-1
-0.3449 (-3.2888)***
ΔLnPPI
0.0762 (4.2381)***
ECMt-1
-0.0836 (-4.6156)***
Note:
1.
Optimal Lag: ARDL (2, 0) selected based on AIC Information criteria
2. *** denotes 1% significance level respectively

As can be seen in Table 4.1, the null hypothesis of no long term
relationship between government expenditures and housing prices can be
rejected for the lags = 2 when LnG is the dependent variable. When we then
turn the LnPPI as the dependent variable and then test the joint significance
of the lagged level variables in the EC version of the ARDL model, on the
contrary, Table 4.1 shows that all corresponding F-statistic fall below the
lower bound critical value (4.94 and 4.04 at 5% and 10% significance level
respectively). We cannot reject the null hypothesis of non-existence of
cointegration. Thus only F (LnG | LnPPI) is significant. Housing price
movements are an important determinant of government expenditures and
this relation holds in the long term.
The estimated long-run coefficients and the error correction
representation selected by the AIC information criteria are reported in the
Table 4.2 and 4.3 respectively (the maximum lag orders set at 2). The LnPPI
carries the significant expected sign, and the error term in the EC-ARDL
model is negative and highly significant which also confirms our earlier
findings that cointegration exists between the variables. The size of the error
term is 0.08 which indicates that once the LnG experiences an external shock,
it takes around 2.5 to 3 years for the domestic demand to return its
equilibrium.
We now turn to the relation between government revenues and housing
prices. As can be seen in the Table 5.1, the null hypothesis can be rejected for
the lag =4 when LnGR is the dependent variable. Since the value exceeds the
upper bound of the critical value bound (at 10% significant level), we can
reject the null of no long-run relationship between the LnGR and LnPPI.
Similarly, we then turn the LnPPI as the dependent variable and then test the
joint significance of the lagged level variables in the EC version of the ARDL
model. The results in Table 5.1 show that all corresponding F-statistic fall
below the upper bound critical value (4.78 at 10% significance level), and
therefore the null hypothesis of non-existence of cointegration cannot be
rejected. The above results indicate that only F (LnGR | LnPPI) is significant
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and therefore there exists a unique long-run-relationship when the LnGR as
the dependent variable and LnPPI can be treated as the “long-run” forcing
variables for the explanation of LnGR.
The estimated long-run coefficients and the error correction
representation selected by the AIC information criteria are reported in the
Table 5.2 and 5.3 respectively (the maximum lag orders set at 4). The
coefficient for LnPPI carries the expected positive sign and is statistically
significant giving an estimated long run elasticity of revenue with respect to
the housing price index at 0.80. The error term in the EC-ARDL model is
negative and highly significant confirming our hypothesis that cointegration
exists between the variables. Moreover, based on the estimated ARDL model
(Table 6.3), we plot the actual and fitted values of the change in lnGR in
Figure 3. We can see that the model fits quite well within the sample period.
Figure 3. Plot of Actual and Fitted Value
(Change in LnGR), 1984 - 2001
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Table 5.1 : F-Statistics for Testing the Existence of a Long-Run Relationship Between
Government Revenue (LnGR) and Property Price (LnPPI), 1984 to 2001 (Annual Data)
Dependent
Lag=1
Lag=2
Lag=3
Lag=4
Variables:
ΔLnGR
0.5548
1.9868
1.8528
5.5478*
ΔLnPPI
1.0665
1.7969
2.7855
4.1540
Note:
1. The critical value bounds for the test are 4.94 – 5.73 at the 95% significance level and 4.04 - 4.78 at the
90% significance level, which are given in Table C1.iii (with an unrestricted intercept and no trend;
number of regressor=1), Shin and Smith (1999).
2. * denotes 10% significance level.

Table 5.2 : Estimated Long-Run Coefficients (Dependent Variable: LnGR)
Regressors
Coefficient (t-ratio)
Intercept
7.7094 (41.14)***
LnPPI
0.8025 (22.37)***
D99 (Dummy 99=1, others=0)
0.2196 (1.4093)
D00 (Dummy 00=1, others=0)
0.2920 (2.7762)***
Note:
1. *** denotes 1% significance level
2. Optimal Lag: ARDL (2, 1) selected based on AIC Information criteria

Table 5.3 : Error Correction Representation of ARDL Model (Dependent variable:ΔGR)
Regressors
Coefficient (t-ratio)
Intercept
4.3990 (5.1194)***
ΔLNGR(-1)
-0.1984 (-1.2418)
ΔLnPPI(-1)
0.6861 (8.5122)***
D99
0.1253 (1.4488)
D00
0.1666 (2.5008)**
ECMt-1
-0.5706 (-4.8711)***
Note:
1. Optimal Lag selected based on AIC Information criteria
2. ** and *** denotes 5% and 1% significance level respectively

IV. Relationship between Real Prime Rate (RPR) and Property Price
(LnPPI), 1997Q1 – 2002Q3
It is sometimes argued that Hong Kong’s depressed housing market after
1997 has to do with high real interest rates. While there is little doubt that
high real interest rates hurt the housing market it is important to find out
whether high real interest rates was mainly a cause or a result of the collapse
in housing prices.
For this exercise we look specifically at data from 1997 to 2002.
Because we hypothesize that the relationship after 1997 runs from housing
prices to real interest rates through the deflationary effects of a collapse in the
housing market, we want to focus on period after 1997. However, the time
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series after 1997, even though we are using quarterly data, is a bit short. So
we include 1997 data as a compromise.
As can be seen in the Table 6.1, the null hypothesis can be rejected for
the lag =3 when RPR is the dependent variable. Since the value exceeds the
upper bound of the critical value bound, we can reject the null of no long-run
relationship between the RPR and LnPPI. We then take the LnPPI to be the
dependent variable and test the joint significance of the lagged level variables
in the EC version of the ARDL model. The results in Table 6.1 show that all
corresponding F-statistic fall below the upper bound critical value (4.78 at
10% significance level). Therefore the null hypothesis of non-existence of
cointegration cannot be rejected. The above results indicate that only F (RPR |
LnPPI) is significant and therefore there exists a unique long-run-relationship
when the RPR as the dependent variable and LnPPI can be treated as the
“long-run” forcing variables for the explanation of RPR.
The estimated long-run coefficients and the error correction
representation selected by the AIC information criteria are reported in the
Table 6.2 and 6.3 respectively (the maximum lag orders set at 4). The LnPPI
carries the significant expected sign, and the error term in the EC-ARDL
model is negative and highly significant, confirming our earlier hypothesis
that cointegration exists between the variables.
Table 6.1 : F-Statistics for Testing the Existence of a Long-Run Relationship Between Real
Prime Rate and Property Price, 1997Q1 to 2002Q3
Dependent
Lag=1
Lag=2
Lag=3
Lag=4
Lag=5
Lag=6
Variables:
ΔRPR
1.83
2.20
5.19*
3.03
1.82
3.54
ΔLnPPI
0.47
1.90
0.18
2.20
3.22
4.23
Note:
1. The critical value bounds for the test are 4.94 – 5.73 at the 95% significance level and 4.04 - 4.78 at the
90% significance level, which are given in Table C1.iii (with an unrestricted intercept and no trend;
number of regressor=1), Shin and Smith (1999).
2. * denotes 10% significance level.

Table 6.2 Estimated Long-Run Coefficients (Dependent Variable: RPR)
Regressors
Coefficient (t-ratio)
Intercept
53.82 (3.66)***
LnPPI
-8.18 (-3.07)***
Note:
1. *** denotes 1% significance level
2. Optimal Lag: ARDL (4, 0) selected based on AIC Information criteria
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Table 6.3 : Error Correction Representation of ARDL Model (Dependent variable:ΔRPR)
Regressors
Coefficient (t-ratio)
Intercept
16.0188 (2.1711)**
ΔRPR(-1)
0.1236(0.7416)
ΔRPR(-2)
0.2460(1.4104)
ΔRPR(-3)
0.6705(3.8501)***
ΔLnPPI
-2.4347(-1.988)**
ECMt-1
-0.2977(-3.2169)***
Note:
1. Optimal Lag: ARDL (4, 0) selected based on AIC Information criteria
2. ** and *** denotes 5% and 1% significance level respectively

V. Conclusions
It is widely believed that Hong Kong’s housing market boom before
1997 is in part due to the restriction of land supply under the Sino-British
Joint Declaration, and in part due to the inflow of Chinese capital,
particularly illicit capital, searching for short term speculative profits. It is
also widely believed that “factor price equalization” played a role in the
collapse of the housing market after 1997. But none of these theories had
been tested statistically or even examined carefully.
The collapse of Hong Kong’s housing market is too sudden for the
factor price equalisation theory to hold, and there is just no evidence that
there was an articially created shortage of housing before 1997. For obvious
reasons there is no data on the amount of illicit capital that came to Hong
Kong from the Mainland. But according to Mr. Wong Leung Sing of the
Research Department of Centaline Property Agency Ltd., a name search
among home buyers had produced only a very low percentage of names with
Putonghua spelling. Mainlanders could, of course, participate in the local
housing market under the guise of registered Hong Kong companies. But
the percentage of buyers in the housing market that are companies have
always been well below 10 per cent, and that includes mostly genuine Hong
Kong-based companies. So while Mainland buyers were indeed a player,
particularly in the luxury homes market, there was little evidence that at any
given time they were major players. In any case one cannot identify a
reversal in Chinese capital after 1997 that could compare with the reversal
following the 16-point austerity programme of Pemier Zhu Rongji in 1993.10
10

According to the Hang Seng Monthly Economic Report of February 1996, “Over the past two
years, the severe austerity measures taken by China has resulted in a dramatic shrinkage in the flow
of funds to Hong Kong. Early 1990s, investors from the Mainland were active in Hong Kong’s
property market, bolstering housing prices and rents. With the departure of this capital activity in
the property market has slowed down….”
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In this paper, we have presented a model that explained the movement in
housing prices very well. Not only did the model track movements before
1998 but it also predicted a major correction to take place in 1998. However,
we identified a structural change in the first quarter of 1998, which is in
agreement with our hypothesis as to how the public housing privatization
programme called the Tenants Purchase Scheme damaged the flow in the
housing market.
We found housing providing a key transmission mechanism between
exports performance and the domestic economy. Movements in housing
prices directly drive domestic demand, as well as government revenues and
government expenditures in Hong Kong. We have also found a close,
bi-directional relationship between employment growth and housing prices.
It will be useful to test this framework on the data in other countries to
assess if it has generality.
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Appendix 1. Variable Definition
Variables

Description

Data Sources

INFL

Inflation Rate (CPI A, year on year
change, 3 month moving average)

Monthly Statistical Bulletin,
various issues, Hong Kong
Monetary Authority

LnD

Log of domestic private demand = Log of
(Private Consumption + Private
construction + Machinery & Equipment)
(current price)

Hong Kong GDP estimates
2001, Hong Kong Census
and Statistics Dept

LnEX

Log total exports of goods and services

Hong Kong GDP estimates
2001, Hong Kong Census
and Statistics Dept

LnG

Log of government consumption
expenditure (current price)

Hong Kong GDP estimates
2001, Hong Kong Census
and Statistics Dept

LnPPI

Log property price index (overall private
domestic housing market) 1989=100

Hong Kong Monthly Digest
of Statistics, Hong Kong
Census and Statistics Dept

PR

Prime Rate (3 month period moving
average)

Monthly Statistical Bulletin,
various issues, Hong Kong
Monetary Authority

RPR

Prime Rate – Inflation Rate (CPI A, year
on year change)

Monthly Statistical Bulletin,
various issues, Hong Kong
Monetary Authority, and;
Hong Kong Monthly Digest
of Statistics, Hong Kong
Census and Statistics Dept
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Appendix 2. Summary of Statistical Results from Tests Performed
Test

Before 1997

Test relationship
between exports and
home prices

Exports drive home
prices, ARDL model

Test relationship
between domestic
demand and home
prices

Test relationship
between government
expenditures and home
prices
Test relationship
between lower tier
home prices and higher
tier home prices
Test relationship
between lower tier
home transactions and
higher tier home
transactions
Test relationship
between Second Hand
Private Home
Transactions and
Home Ownership
Scheme “free market
transactions”
Test causes of plunge
in second hand home
transactions

After 1997

Actual values
diverge from
predicted values
increasingly over
time
Domestic demand movements do not cause
home price movements.

Where reported
See Appendix available
from the author.

See Appendix available
from the author.

Home price movements cause domestic
demand swings. (Granger/Johansen and
ARDL)
Home prices drive government expenditures,
ARDL model.

See Appendix available
from the author.

Lower-tier home prices typically drive higher
tier home prices but not the other way round.

Ho, Haurin, and Wong
(2003).

Lower-tier home transactions typically drive
higher tier home prices but not the other way
round.

Ho, Haurin, and Wong
(2003)

Very significant positive relation found.

Yeung (2001), p.65.

Regression shows Tenants Purchase Scheme
has more significant and greater impact on
second hand home transactions than the Asian
Financial Crisis, lending credence to the
hypothesis that TPS played a key role in
“freezing” the housing market turnover.

Ho, Tse, and Wong
(2003)
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Appendix 3. Relative Trade Performance of Hong Kong before and after 1997
Merchandise Exports
199819942001
1997

Cumulative
Growth Rates
% of Prior
Performance

Services Exports
199819942001
1997

Cumulative
Growth Rates
% of Prior
Performance

Hong Kong

9.27%

24.25%

38%

18.93%

23.67%

80%

Japan

4.01%

6.03%

67%

3.03%

20.01%

15%

Korea

13.70%

41.82%

33%

19.23%

56.71%

34%

Malaysia

19.94%

33.81%

59%

23.11%

69.23%

33%

Philippines

9.24%

87.03%

11%

-58.51%

124.18%

-47%

Singapore

10.79%

29.08%

37%

38.36%

32.53%

118%

Taipei

10.85%

30.37%

36%

21.88%

29.78%

73%

7.13%

34.35%

21%

10.66%

28.29%

38%

Canada

21.24%

29.66%

72%

7.88%

32.37%

24%

France

0.38%

20.58%

2%

-5.13%

Germany

5.02%

20.13%

25%

-1.38%

34.23%

-4%

UK

-0.13%

36.73%

0%

2.84%

41.91%

7%

Brazil

13.85%

21.70%

64%

23.10%

13.93%

166%

World

12.11%

30.00%

40%

8.74%

27.61%

32%

USA

7%

-73%

Source: World Trade Organization, International Trade Statistics: Exports 1991-2001.
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/statis_e.htm
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